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ABSTRACT
This study offers empirical evidence about how the structure of government and
private ownership affects productivity in Chinese firms. It uses the microdata of China’s
most recent decennial industrial census, covering all of the 23,000 large and medium
industrial firms operating in China during 1995.
The results show that government decentralization – “federalism” – plays an
important role in improving the performance of not just collective firms, but also state-
owned and mixed public/private ownership firms. This result is strongly confirmatory of
much of the recent theoretical work on transition economies that posits a key role for
government in the efficient operation of markets.
Privatization makes a big difference in performance for firms administered at the
federal level, especially state-owned enterprises. Private ownership also makes a large
difference for wholly foreign-owned firms, nearly all located in special districts. In local
jurisdictions, however, there is little difference in productivity across the various non-
state ownership types, supporting the argument that the regulatory environment played a
critical role in successful business performance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Transition economies have experienced a wide range of economic outcomes, raising
important questions about why some countries are successful and others are not. China is widely
believed to be the most successful transition economy, yet its reforms are still not fully
understood. Although it has relied on a combination of government decentralization –
“federalism” – and privatization, most of the empirical work has focused on the latter. Through
an analysis of business enterprise microdata, we offer new empirical evidence about how both
factors, together, affect business performance in China.
Federalism plays a prominent role in recent theoretical work, which focuses on the
interplay of different types of Chinese enterprises and the government entities that regulate them
[Qian and Weingast 1997; Che and Qian 1998a, 1998b; Qian and Roland 1998]. For example,
improved rules and regulations for business operations, tightening of the so-called “soft budget
constraint” and reductions in hold-up problems all have been linked to local governance, and
collectives in particular. Gérard Roland [2000] recently reviewed much of this work. While we
are not able to fully disentangle the mechanisms at work, we are able to make some useful
distinctions about the forces at play.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the key government jurisdictions that administer
enterprises. Much of the empirical work on China has focused on small township and village
collective enterprises, who have been a source of dynamism for the Chinese economy.
1 Only two
econometric studies have looked at the role of government administration, finding support for a
positive effect of local jurisdiction on state-owned firms [Jefferson 1999; Sun 2000]. We are not
aware of any studies that look at the role of local governance for other ownership types such as
joint stock or foreign joint venture firms. By using the microdata from China’s most recent
decennial industrial census, which covered all of the 23,000 large and medium industrial firms
                                                
1. Generally, studies have found that collective enterprises and other non-state firms are better
performers. For example, analysis of the early reforms using industry data showed that these non-state
firms had much higher growth in multi-factor productivity than state-owned enterprises [McGuckin et al.
1992, 1993]. Studies using individual firm data refined and extended these findings into the 1990s
[Jefferson and Singh 1999; OECD 2000].FEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 3
operating in China during 1995, we are able to assess the role of government administration in
business performance.
2
Our strongest empirical result is that firms governed by local jurisdictions exhibit
superior performance. When county, township, and village governments administer firms, the
performance of not just collective firms but also purely state-owned and mixed public/private
firms is significantly improved.
3 There are many mechanisms at work in this finding. Locally
controlled collectives have incentives closer to those in private firms and they face greater
product market competition than other Chinese enterprises. The advantages of locally
administered firms are also associated with the ability of local jurisdictions to offset efficiency-
destroying actions, including weak institutional and legal support, by the state. On the other
hand, it is also likely that local governments selectively predate on the more private firms in their
jurisdictions. This kind of tradeoff is suggested by the tendency for performance differences to
be minimized across ownership types while performance levels are uniformly higher under local
jurisdictional control.
Our results also suggest, consistent with earlier work, that ownership matters for
efficiency. Collectives, however, no longer predominate, as other types of “private” ownership
and governance structures are able to achieve similar productivity levels. So while collectives
perform better than state-owned enterprises, they are not more efficient than ownership types
with mixed public and private investment. And collectives are much less efficient than a special
category of private firms: wholly foreign-owned firms with no mainland, Hong Kong, Macau, or
Taiwan ownership. These firms are located in one special district, suggesting that they operate
under very different rules from other enterprises in China.
Examination of the performance of firms with private equity in their ownership structure
strengthens the argument that the level of government administration is a key factor. Increasing
                                                
2. These data cover manufacturing, utility, and mining firms, and are considered to be more reliable
than most other surveys, because they were directly collected from enterprises, bypassing often-
politicized intermediate authorities. Moreover, we focus on the large and medium sub-sample that
received the most scrutiny. The data were used to make 20 percent downward corrections to output
statistics for the collective sector over the 1991–1995 period [Dougherty 1997].
3. The choice to focus on the county level and below was dictated for both theoretical and empirical
reasons. Much of the case study research on China has observed that the strongest incentive effects of
fiscal decentralization are present at the county, township, and village levels [Oi 1992; Walder 1995].
Moreover, analysis of the effects of jurisdiction levels on firm efficiency suggested that the jurisdictionsFEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 4
privatization appears to only make a difference for firms administered by “federal” jurisdictions
– those at the central, provincial, and prefecture levels. We conjecture that federal jurisdictions
have to make more concessions in order to attract the private investment than local areas where
operating environments are friendlier to business.
There are several potential econometric issues that cloud our central findings. In
particular, it is possible that some of the differences in performance arise from the liberalization
process itself. If firms are chosen for private ownership and local jurisdictional control because
they are the “best” performers, then this could give a misleading signal of the cause of the
performance differences. In addition, firms with private ownership may choose to use “better”
workers and more (and better) capital in their operations – beyond what we were able to measure
and control for in our cross-section regressions. Both factors can bias the estimated coefficients
that capture the impact of ownership and federalism.
We were able to perform some basic tests for endogeneity and selection effects and they
indicated that many of the firms that would be expected to perform well remained under state
and federal control, suggesting that selectivity from the liberalization process is not driving our
empirical results. Moreover, we used several fully interactive versions of our basic production
function model to ensure that the results were not driven by the fact that more private and locally
governed firms tend to adopt different – such as more capital intensive – technologies. Thus,
while it is impossible to fully rule out process-based interpretations of the results with cross-
section data, the tests we were able to conduct suggest that such selectivity biases are not driving
the principal results.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we provide a brief overview of
the empirical findings in the literature. Section three outlines our basic empirical model – a gross
output production function – and the data we use to estimate it. This section also outlines the
variables we use to measure administration and ownership. Section four presents our key
empirical findings. The fifth section offers some concluding comments.
                                                                                                                                                            
at the county level and below were quite distinct from those at the prefecture level and above, which we
term federal in this study.FEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 5
II. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL WORK
Virtually all studies – regardless of data and methodology – agree that collectives
performed better than state-owned enterprises [Woo et al. 1994; Jefferson et al. 1996]. Since
local governments more often administer collectives than their state-owned counterparts, the
standard results are suggestive of the role of jurisdiction, although they do not separate out the
effect of administration from ownership.
Although interactions between jurisdiction and ownership have not been explored,
private equity has generally been associated with better performance.
4 For instance, higher levels
of non-state equity have been found to improve productivity in publicly listed joint stock firms
[Xu and Wang 1998]. Research by the World Bank and OECD has found that collectives,
foreign funded enterprises, and mixed private enterprises all have higher profitability and return
to asset ratios than state-owned enterprises [Jefferson et al. 1999c; OECD 2000b]. Similar results
have been found using other measures of efficiency, with the more private forms of ownership
performing best [Zhang et al. 2001].
5 Whether these results hold up in both local and federal
jurisdictions generally remains to be determined.
6
There is some work on the issue of jurisdiction specifically. Case studies have supported
the view that local governance in collectives and state-owned enterprises improves performance
[Granick 1990; Oi 1992; Walder 1995]. In addition, a World Bank firm-level study finds some
indications that the level of jurisdiction plays a role in state-owned enterprise performance
[Jefferson 1999]. And in perhaps the most rigorous study of this issue, Jian Sun [2000] finds an
economically large and statistically significant central/sub-central jurisdictional effect on
                                                
4. The amount of private equity in a firm is not entirely captured by its registered ownership type
[Qian 1995; Gregory et al. 2000]. There is only one firm-level study, Xiaonian Xu and Yan Wang [1999],
that examines the performance impacts of equity involvement. The Xu and Wang study looks at publicly
listed joint stock firms in 1993, finding that higher levels of state equity tend to reduce productivity.
5. Numerous firm-level studies on the performance of Chinese enterprise compare state-owned
enterprises with collectives, especially the township and village collectives. Most of this work is based on
special surveys covering the period before 1995. Perhaps the most ambitious empirical research is a series
of recent World Bank studies collected in Gary Jefferson and Inderjit Singh [1999]. As part of this effort
Jefferson et al. [1999c] review this empirical literature at length. Yanrui Wu [1996] also provides an
extensive survey of this literature.
6. In a study of garment and metal casting industries in the Yangtze River region, Sonobe and Otsuka
[2001] find evidence that privatization of township and village enterprises has significantly improved
productivity, with a lag of several years.FEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 6
productivity – of about 25 percent during the years 1991 to 1994 – for a sample of state-owned
enterprises.
III. EMPIRICAL DESIGN
We use a firm-level gross output production function to isolate differences in
jurisdictional governance and ownership structure from other factors that affect productivity. The
production function approach has been found to yield reasonable results in a wide range of
economies [Tybout 2000]. Moreover, the coefficient estimates we obtain are reasonable
compared to analogous studies conducted in the United States and elsewhere.
The gross output production function has strong theoretical advantages over value added
production functions for productivity measurement [OECD 2000a]. This is particularly true at
lower levels of aggregation such as firm or industry where the problems of double counting are
not severe and separability assumptions are not needed. Their use can make a substantial
difference in the results obtained. McGuckin and Nguyen [1993] demonstrated this fact for
China using relatively aggregated industry data. And in studies with U.S. Census microdata,
Bartelsman and Doms [2000] also report very different results for value-added and gross output
production functions.
Most firm-level studies of China have used a value added production function. The use of
value added has a particular disadvantage in studies of Chinese firms because many of them have
negative value added. This leads to substantial reductions in sample size since the log-linear
functional form drops these firms from the analysis. Exit is not an option for many Chinese
firms, so this is potentially a misleading practice. About nine percent of our sample, or 1,885
firms, have negative value added in 1995. Compared with other firms, their productivity is about
half as large, they exhibit far lower profits, and have about half as many workers.
A. The Basic Model
The production function is specified in log-linear labor productivity terms as:
/  ; : 6    (1)
Where L is a vector of log gross output per worker, X is a matrix of standard input
variables, W is a matrix of the dummy control variables, and S is a matrix of the key variables ofFEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 7
interest: jurisdiction, ownership, and/or equity variables. The form of Equation 1 means that the
coefficients on dummy variables represent average total factor productivity (TFP) differences
between groups of firms.
Equation 1 constrains the technologies of all firms to be the same because the
specification insists that the elasticities of each input with respect to the output of the firm are the
same. While dummy variables will pick up some of there differences by controlling for the types
of activities the firms undertake, there are two issues of great import to our primary goal of
estimating the impacts of ownership and governmental jurisdiction on productivity.  First, if the
technology that a firm chooses is systematically related to its ownership type or jurisdiction, a
reasonable conjecture, based on simple tabulations of capital/labor ratios, is that Cobb-Douglas
estimates of the impacts will be biased. Second, the choice of firms to be privatized and shifted
to local jurisdiction may be systematically related to productivity so that we attribute the impacts
of the choice process to the ownership and jurisdiction.
Concerns about bias led us to estimate the ownership and jurisdiction coefficients using
fully interactive versions of Equation 1. The fully interactive specifications allow the input
coefficients to vary for each ownership type and jurisdictional grouping. Comparison of the
interactive models with the model with no interactions indicates that our variables of interest are
not appreciably affected by failure to allow for this type of production technology difference. In
addition, since firm-level data generally show wide heterogeneity within industries (see Jensen
and McGuckin [1997]), we also tested Equation 1 within two-digit industries. Although the
number of observations in many industries limits the strength of the estimates, these tests also
support the results we present.
To account for potential selection and endogeneity effects in the decentralization and
privatization process, we also estimate an instrumental variable model. Because our data are
cross-sectional, we are limited in what we can do about this issue. However, there is some
information in the data set that is potentially useful, so we estimated a two-stage instrumental
variable estimator, with the first stage estimated using Probit to determine the probability of
decentralization. These estimates were generally supportive of our results, particularly with
respect to the jurisdiction issue.FEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 8
B. Data
7
Our data are derived from the Third National Industrial Census, which covers all of the
roughly 23,000 large and medium size industrial firms operating in China during 1995.
8 We used
20,992 firms for which all data are available in most of our analysis.
This data has a number of attractive features. First, it offers a complete census. Second,
the year it covers is more current than many of the studies in the literature. Third, the National
Bureau of Statistics (NBS) adopted a number of improvements over previous surveys in this
once-a-decade industrial census [NBS 1996].
The data quality appears to be better than most survey data. For example, NBS analysis
indicated that output for many township and village enterprises was overstated in its own earlier
annual surveys. This finding was reflected in substantial downward adjustments to the previously
released official 1991–1995 output figures [Dougherty 1997]. Overstating output tends to
overstate productivity, possibly leading to inflated performance for collectives in studies based
on earlier data. Our focus on large and medium firms, which are more rigorously surveyed than
smaller firms, further reduces exaggeration.
The Industrial Census provides a wealth of detailed information on each enterprise. The
range of available data is far wider than that used in most studies. We not only have data on
inputs and outputs, but also measures of capital and labor quality that are included in the
production function estimating equation. The data include firm-specific information on
ownership, jurisdiction and equity, as well as four-digit industry, location, and age of the firm.
We now turn to a discussion of the data and the variables used in estimating the
production function.
C. Variables
The input variables (in X) from Equation 1 are log capital per worker, log materials per
worker, log workers, log average wage, and the proportion of production equipment book value
with 1990s vintage. Essentially, it is an unconstrained Cobb-Douglas production function
supplemented with input quality measures.
                                                
7. A data appendix with more details about the dataset, variable definitions, and model estimates is
available upon request.FEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 9
The capital measure is, like most measures of capital, subject to substantial caveats. It
includes all capital of the firm and is calculated as the sum of the year-end book value of net
fixed capital plus other capital.
9 Net book value is based on standard Chinese depreciation rates
on plant and equipment.
We supplemented the capital stock measure with a capital equipment vintage variable
that measures the value share (%) of total production equipment manufactured in the 1990s.
Although the capital stock vintage variable is the leading cause of lost observations, reducing the
data set size by 935 observations, the variable was very significant in all estimates of the model.
The number of production workers, technicians, and managers measures labor input.
Service and other employees unrelated to production are excluded from the measure. The
average worker’s total wage is used as a proxy for labor quality. Wages include base salaries and
quantity-based compensation, incentive and other bonuses, as well as various subsidies and
living allowances.
Materials are the cost of raw material inputs and other intermediate costs, including
overhead and interest charges. The average ratio of materials to gross output is 83 percent
overall, with non-state-owned firms tending to have insignificantly higher average ratios, except
for joint stock firms, that have a lower ratio, at 78 percent.
Dummy control variables were included for age, region, and industry in order to account
for the effects of technology, the output and price structure of the firm, and other variations that
could affect measured productivity. Age captures firm age effects, and is based on the
enterprise’s year of origin (in five categories). Region is based on enterprise location, by districts
(332 districts) when sample size allows, and by province-level region (30 regions) elsewhere.
Industry is represented by four-digit industry code (559 industries), which uses the 1994 Chinese
standard based on ISIC Rev. 3 (NBS 1993).
                                                                                                                                                            
8. Large and medium firms, which represent 39 percent of industrial output in 1995, are defined by
the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China using criteria based on industry-specific production
capacity [NBS 1993].
9. Other capital includes floating capital, which is defined as single-use or rapidly depreciated
material products that are used in the course of production or sales, distinguished from material inputs
because they do not enter directly into production [NBS 1996]. In sensitivity tests, we tried several
different measures of capital, including net fixed capital as well as only production machinery. The use of
alternative capital measures did not affect the reported results.FEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 10
The key variables of interest in S are dummy variables for the level of jurisdiction
administering the firm and the types of ownership structures. Given their importance, they are
described in some detail.
D. Key variable: Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is defined as the administrative level of government that supervises the
enterprise, collects its taxes, and most directly enforces local and national laws. The levels
include central government, provincial, prefecture and municipality, county, township, and
village. We treat county, township, and village jurisdictions as local, and other jurisdictions
above the local level as federal.
 10
There are several reasons to expect jurisdiction to affect performance. Unfortunately,
they are not entirely exclusive and therefore identifying the relative importance of each is
problematic. Nevertheless, we expect that firms administered by local jurisdictions should
outperform other firms.
The first reason is that enterprise decision rights to use, sell, and receive proceeds from
its assets are more concentrated inside locally administered enterprises [Groves et al. 1994; Qian
1995; Lin 1998; Jefferson and Singh 1999]. Thus in more locally administered enterprises
manager and owner objectives are likely to be more closely aligned – reducing agency costs.
Surveys appear to confirm that local government enterprises have more areas of decision-making
authority than most state-owned enterprises, and therefore may be able to act more like private
firms in the face of competition [Jefferson et al. 1999a, 1998b].
A second idea is that soft budget constraints are “hardened” for local governments
[Granick 1990]. Competition between jurisdictions over investment and resources has intensified
with regional decentralization so that enterprises may not always be bailed out in the event of
failure [Oi 1992; Walder 1995; Li et al. 2000]. This effect is reinforced by limited access by
local government jurisdictions to state bank financing [Gregory et al. 2000; Qian 2000]. The
resulting fear of failure creates stronger profit incentives for locally administered firms even
when they are government owned [Qian and Weingast 1997; Qian and Roland 1998; Che and
Qian 1998a].
                                                
10. Op cite note 3. In addition, some firms (671) have no jurisdictional information. These firms are
excluded when we analyze jurisdiction.FEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 11
A third idea is that hold-up problems, such as those that arise with incomplete contracts,
can be better resolved by locally administered firms where the incentives for contract
enforcement are more closely aligned with governments’ interests. Such incentives could also
arise from competition amongst local governments for outside investment. Firms offering the
most benefits to the local government would likely be favored [Che and Qian 1998b; Li 1998].
While this may benefit firms with government involvement more than private firms (who are
more difficult to tax), it may improve performance for all ownership types relative to centrally
controlled firms where strong incentives for contract enforcement are less likely to be present.
11
A variety of models of this nature are discussed in Roland [2000].
E. Key variable: Ownership
The ownership variable is based on a firm’s registered ownership classification as defined
by NBS. While we anticipate that “more private” ownership types will contribute positively to
productivity, determining what is private is not so simple. These categories include state-owned,
domestic joint venture (lianying), collective, joint stock (gufenzhi), private (siying), Hong Kong,
Macau, or Taiwan-invested (gangaotai qiye), foreign joint ventures (zhongwai hezou/hezi), and
wholly foreign-owned (waizi).
12 Many of these ownership categories are unique to China, and do
not necessarily have direct analogies in other countries. While the pure foreign-owned firms are
closest in internal structure to a competitive private firm in a country like the United States, these
firms face special regulations in China which may help or hinder them, such as tax breaks and
limits on the range of their activities.
The vast majority of large and medium firms in China have substantial government
ownership, with the largest number being state-owned (15,433 firms). In principle, these firms
are owned by the central government, and it reserves the ultimate right to allocate residual cash
                                                
11. Local governments themselves may engage in predatory behavior if not restrained by self-interest,
and federalist systems may give them the opportunity to engage in “capture” from private firms at local
levels [Bardhan and Mookherjee 1999; Yao 2001]. This type of behavior would benefit collective firms at
the expense of more private ownership types such as foreign joint ventures [Che and Qian 1998b].
12. There were three domestic private firms in our database of “medium and large” firms in 1995.
Until the late 1990s, it was extremely difficult for private firms to obtain the necessary business licenses
that would allow them to grow beyond “getihu” status of eight or fewer employees [Gregory et al. 2000].
The domestic joint ventures are a small (217-firm) group, and there seems to be little remarkable about
them. These firms are ventures between state and collective owners. In addition, there are 19 firms with
“other” forms of ownership that we do not examine.FEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 12
flow and assets [Qian 1995]. However, under the policy of regional decentralization, local
governments in China were delegated control over many enterprises from the beginning of the
reform period [Granick 1990]. This has led to provincial, prefecture, and county administration
of many state-owned firms.
Government-owned firms suffer from a problem of moral hazard called “soft budget
constraints,” where expectations of bailout in the case of failure destroy profit objectives [Kornai
1980]. These distortions are reinforced by societal obligations imposed by government to
provide employment and retirement benefits. This problem should affect state-owned enterprises
the most strongly, but can also affect other government-dominated firms such as publicly traded
companies that have diversified their ownership, as some recent high-profile cases have
demonstrated [Wall Street Journal 12/4/2000]. Government involvement in business also means
that the incentives of government to provide public goods such as contract enforcement are
affected by their own business activities [Gadal and Shirley 1995; Li 1998].
A large number of government firms are classified as collectives (3,966 firms), which are
owned by government jurisdictions below the central government [Jefferson and Rawski 1999].
These firms are usually given more autonomy in their operation than state-owned firms, and the
control rights of their provincial, prefecture, county, township, and village government owners
are not usually subject to central government intervention. While these firms generally have less
access to state bank financing and monopoly rights, the better alignment of the interests of the
owners and managers in these firms may reduce agency costs [Che and Qian 1998a].
Boards of directors and standardized financial disclosure practices characterize joint
stock firms (959 firms), which have been corporatized. Most of these firms were state-owned
before conversion, and most are still dominated by central government and state institutional
equity. Several hundred of the joint stock firms are listed on stock markets, primarily on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges, including some overseas as well. However, domestically
traded shares have many restrictions [Xu and Wang 1999]. A recent ranking put these firms near
the bottom in a worldwide governance index [CLSA Emerging Markets 2000], due to inequitable
treatment of minority shareholders and lack of timely and accurate disclosure of firm financials.
While official ownership types do not fully describe the ownership status of Chinese
firms [Li 1996; Gregory et al. 2000] ownership equity information is reported for most of theFEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 13
firms in our sample.
13  There are four identifiable classes of equity: state shares, legal person
shares, individual shares, and foreign shares. Since legal person shares typically belong to
institutions controlled by the government, we treat only individual and foreign shares as private
equity. We identify those firms that have 50 percent or more private equity, 10 percent or more
private equity, and any private equity for analysis (dummy variables representing each threshold
are defined and used in the estimates of Table 6).
14
Some private ownership may improve performance because it helps to reduce perverse
incentives in government owned firms through better monitoring of managers and pressure for
profit objectives [Kornai 1980; Gadal and Shirley 1995; Sachs and Woo 1997]. However, the
effectiveness of outside ownership may be reduced by lack of control or autonomy and excessive
constraints on decision-making [Jefferson et al. 1999b; Lin et al. 1998]. On the other hand, the
existence of private ownership may signal that the state has reduced constraints in order to attract
private capital, for example by offering “guarantees” against hold-up of the firm.
Although some foreign private equity has been tolerated in joint stock companies and (to
a much more limited extent) in state-owned and collectively held enterprises, the primary vehicle
for foreign direct investment (FDI) has been foreign joint ventures. Joint venture firms (1,849
firms) typically involve a foreign company and a state-owned domestic enterprise, with equity
reflecting their respective stakes in the enterprise. While there are many restrictions on these
enterprises—particularly with respect to the sectors open for entry—this has been a popular
vehicle for foreign direct investment, the accumulation of which exceeded US$200 billion by
1995. Over half of the joint venture enterprises involve partners in Hong Kong, Macau, or
Taiwan (933 firms). We distinguish these non-mainland Greater China-invested enterprises from
other foreign enterprises, since they usually face different regulations and have more operational
flexibility.
Wholly foreign-owned enterprises (97 firms) are allowed, but face even more restrictions.
They are prohibited from operations in a number of industries and, until October 2000, were
required to either provide advanced technology or be primarily export-oriented [USDoS 1996].
Consistent with this observation, Table 1 indicates that 62 percent of the output of these firms
                                                
13. A sizable number of firms (1,738) did not provide equity information in the census. These firms
are excluded when we analyze private equity.
14. Tests using various formulations of the equity variable suggest that our results are fairly robust
with respect to the threshold effect.FEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 14
was exported. Almost all of these ventures are located in special economic zones, where they
receive exemptions or substantial reductions in various types of taxes and fees, and have
streamlined regulations [Litwack and Qian 1998].
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 1 shows that the variation in gross output per worker (labor productivity) and other
characteristics across ownership types is very large. Raw labor productivity in pure foreign firms
(496,000 yuan per worker) is over five times higher than that in state-owned enterprises, which
have the lowest labor productivity (81,000 yuan), and next to lowest capital intensity. Pure
foreign firms have the highest capital intensity, newest vintage of capital, and highest paid
workers (955 yuan per month). They also export the largest share of their sales (62 percent) and
are relatively young firms (average 1991 founding). Joint venture firms are similar in many
respects, although they export less than half as much of their sales.
The firms with the lowest capital intensity – collectives – have higher labor productivity
(118,000 yuan/worker) than state-owned enterprises. This is true despite collectives’
significantly smaller size (in workers and capital) and lower wages. Remarkably, they export
nearly twice as much as state firms and almost as much as joint ventures. Only joint stock firms
– who have moderate labor productivity – stand out in terms of the large size of their capital.
Nevertheless, their workforce size and education is similar to state firms. They export marginally
more than state firms.
Raw differences in labor productivity between locally and federally administered firms
vary greatly by type of ownership. Among state-owned enterprises, locally administered firms
are not different, yet among collectives, they are higher. However, for other forms of ownership,
federal firms have higher raw labor productivity, but locally administered firms have about half
the capital base and make do with less skilled workers. Moreover, they tend to export as much or
more than their federally administered counterparts.
A. Production Function Estimates
We first estimate the production function (Equation 1) on the entire dataset. As shown in
Table 2, the coefficients on the input variables are quite reasonable when compared to results
typically found in microdata cross-section production functions. The estimated coefficients forFEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 15
jurisdiction and ownership structure give the productivity differences relative to the default
category (state ownership and federal jurisdictional administration). The effect of local
government administration relative to federal administration is remarkably strong, with a highly
significant estimated difference of 7.7 percent. This result is highly supportive of the idea that
local governance affects business performance, regardless of ownership.
The controlled difference between the wholly foreign and state-owned ownership types is
18.6 percent. While the other ownership categories are more productive than state ownership,
they do not achieve the level of the wholly foreign enterprises. The regression results suggest
that the ownership types can be grouped into three productivity categories: (i) the lowest level
for state-owned enterprises, (ii) a moderate level for collective firms, joint stock corporations,
and joint venture firms (with 6.0 percent to 7.6 percent more productivity than state-owned), and
(iii) the highest level for pure foreign owned firms (18.6 percent). The differences between the
lowest level and the other two classes are highly significant. The difference between the highest
and the moderate level is just significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
As noted earlier, using a fully interactive model, we find that the implied estimates of the
impact of ownership and jurisdictional governance are not substantially affected. Local
government administration continues to have an impact of at least 7.7 percent relative to federal
administration. And collective firms, joint stock corporations, and joint venture firms still
perform 5 to 7 percent better than state-owned firms. In addition, the difference between the
purely private foreign firms and state ownership types is still around 19 percent.
B. Endogeneity
In order to determine whether selectivity from the liberalization process might be biasing
our results, we re-estimated the production function using an instrumental variable model. We
first examined whether the local jurisdictional administration variable might be endogenous, and
second considered the additional possibility of endogeneity of both local jurisdiction and
privatization. And while the information available is limited, endogeneity does not seem to be
substantively distorting the key results.
We used two instruments in the estimations. The first is the administrative size
classification of the enterprise, which was likely used in determining which firms to restructure,
as part of the “zhuada fangxiao” (hold onto the large, release the small) policy. Second, we haveFEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 16
financial performance information from the previous year, for which measurement error should
not be correlated with that in the current year.
Since local jurisdiction is a dichotomous variable, we use Probit in the first stage
estimation, regressed on the two instruments and the remaining “exogenous” variables. The
standard cumulative normal of the estimated values gives a prediction of the probability that a
firm is administered locally. We use this probability as an instrument in a second stage least
squares estimate of the augmented production function, thus accounting for the potential
endogeneity of jurisdiction. The pseudo R-squared of this first stage implies that this equation
explains about 38 percent of the variation, suggesting that it is a plausible model of
decentralization.
This instrumental variable estimator yields qualitatively similar results for the effects of
jurisdiction, with a larger coefficient (.51) in the same direction as the OLS estimate (.10) of the
model.
15 If endogeneity is biasing the results, then the most likely direction of the bias is to hide
some of the beneficial effects of local jurisdictional administration. Put differently, there was
probably a tendency on the part of supervisory governments to select poorer performing firms for
hand-off to local governments. This comports with the intuition that the central government
would want to rid its hands of the worst performers since it has the power to force a local
subordinate government jurisdiction to take the firm.
Selection may also bias the results for ownership since many of the joint stock and joint
venture firms were converted from state-owned (or collective) ownership types. If the best
enterprises are chosen for conversion, this will tend to overstate the impact of privatization.
Since we do not have detailed information on which enterprises were converted, we cannot make
a clear determination. However, there was a dramatic increase in the productivity of state-owned
and collective enterprises over 1995 to 1999 (Appendix, Table A-1). The size of this increase is
large enough to suggest that it is quite possible that the worst performers were converted,
                                                
15. This result is strengthened by a sensitivity test of the instruments using only the size category
dummies. A similar two-stage instrumental estimate with Probit in the first stage yields a coefficient on
local jurisdiction almost twice as large as a comparable OLS estimate (0.18 compared with .10), but
smaller than the estimate described here.FEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 17
although if enough poor performers were closed and new firms entered, this could also explain
this change.
16
Despite limited information about specific conversions, we performed a similar test to
that described above for jurisdiction. In the first stage, we pooled the state-owned, collective
firms, and mixed public/private ownership firms to estimate the probability of conversion.
17 The
production function was re-estimated using the predicted probability of mixed ownership, and
local jurisdiction from above. The results for jurisdiction remained comparable with the earlier
estimates. For ownership, the mixed ownership effects were larger than what was obtained in the
OLS estimates, which is consistent with the idea that the worst performers were converted; but
the large standard error in these estimates suggests that the instruments are quite weak.
C. The Effects of Jurisdiction
The effects of ownership and jurisdiction were examined by estimating the impact of
jurisdiction separately for each ownership type: Separate production function estimates were
made for state-owned, collective, joint stock, HK/TW-invested, and foreign joint venture firms.
This specification gives distinct estimates of the impact of jurisdiction for each ownership type,
and also allows the input elasticities and other production function coefficients to vary by
ownership type.
The results of this exercise are shown in Table 3, which gives local jurisdiction dummy
variable coefficients from separate estimates on each of five ownership types, except for pure
foreign firms where no variation in jurisdiction is present. These estimates offer strong support
for the importance of jurisdiction in enterprise performance.
Productivity differences between local and federal jurisdictions are observed within each
type of ownership. Within collectives, jurisdiction accounts for an 8.5 percent productivity
difference, with a similar difference, 8.7 percent, for state-owned firms.
18 Both differences are
                                                
16. Li and Lui [2001] find evidence that governments in China indeed privatize the worst performing
(loss-making) state firms in order to reduce the subsidies that they have to pay.
17. We also estimated the probability of conversion for each of the mixed public/private ownership
types separately (joint stock firms, HK/TW joint ventures, and foreign joint ventures). The results were
very similar.
18. If local jurisdictions are re-defined as township and village only (with federal as county and
above), the contribution of local jurisdiction for collectives is somewhat less – 5.7% – yet still highly
significant. For other ownership types, the local effect is as large or larger than with the original definitionFEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 18
highly significant. For joint stock companies the difference between local and federal is even
larger, 9.3 percent. The impact of local governance is a smaller yet still significant 5.4 percent
for Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan-invested enterprises, and a not quite significant 4.6 percent
for foreign joint ventures.
While previous studies have found that locally administered collectives perform better
than state-owned enterprises, these results are broader: they suggest that for any type of
government-invested enterprise, including state-owned enterprises and joint stock enterprises,
local administration yields significant benefits. Moreover, since the effect is also present in the
more private firms in our sample – those in which firm autonomy and profit incentives are
already likely to be strong – the improved performance is likely a result of a better regulatory
and institutional environment.
D. The Effects of Ownership
We also looked at the effects of ownership interactively, by splitting the sample and
estimating the ownership effect separately within sub-samples of locally and federally
administered firms. This specification allows the effects of ownership to differ depending on the
level of the governing jurisdiction. The estimated productivity differences across ownership
types are shown in Table 4.
19
For enterprises governed by federal jurisdictions, ownership is a key determinant of
productivity performance, with foreign joint ventures performing significantly better than
collectives. In contrast, except for state-owned enterprises, productivity differences across
ownership are virtually non-existent for those firms within local jurisdictions. Still, for all
ownership types (as shown in Table 3), the local jurisdiction variable is linked to better
performance.
It is impossible with the data at hand to fully explain these findings. Nevertheless, it
appears that under local government administration the regulatory environment tends to equalize
performance across ownership types (“the playing field is leveled”). This is probably a result of a
                                                                                                                                                            
(and just as significant), although only 60 to 144 firms in each non-collective ownership type have
township or village jurisdictions.
19. A version of this specification that allowed production input elastiticities to be fully interactive
with ownership type was also estimated, first for local and then for federal jurisdictions. The implied
differences among ownership types were very similar to the figures shown in Table 4.FEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 19
complex mix of factors with differences in internal incentives and corporate governance
procedures being weighed against rules and regulatory enforcement procedures to yield a rough
balance in enterprise efficiency across enterprises. This is consistent with the fact that state-
owned enterprises still perform poorly relative to other types of enterprises. The problem for
state-owned enterprises is that even though they are locally administered, they are still less likely
to fail: Since they know state banks are likely to save them, they do not operate as efficiently as
other enterprises.
20
E. Jurisdiction and Private Equity
As noted previously, ownership type alone does not fully capture the extent of
privatization in China. Almost 25% of all large and medium enterprises have some private
equity. This equity includes shares sold to employees and outside investors, both foreign and
domestic.
Private equity appears to only benefit firms classified as state-owned under federal
governance, as shown in Table 5, but the effect is substantial, particularly for firms with a
majority of ownership in private hands. We find a highly significant effect on productivity of 5.3
percent for any private equity in these firms, “10% or more” private equity yielding a 6.2 percent
productivity effect, and “50% or more” private equity yielding an 8.5 percent effect.
Surprisingly, the presence of private equity makes nearly two-thirds of the difference.
21
In contrast, at the local level, private equity appears to have no significant effect for state-
owned enterprises. This is consistent with the idea that local government administration may
already confer many of the advantages that private equity offers. Federally administered state-
owned enterprises may offer specific concessions to get outside investment. These concessions
may involve financial restructuring, relief from the burdens of retired workers, and guarantees
against interference with business activities. Alternatively, this may reflect some selectivity on
                                                
20. Access to bank financing can be a double-edged sword. While certainty of access leads to severe
moral hazard, severe financing constraints can make business impossible. Some local jurisdictions have
experienced extraordinary turnover of collective enterprises in recent years, because of lack of
commercial bank financing. This is despite their typically higher productivity.
21. One possibility is that the new owners are not able to exercise effective control rights. Poor
representation of private shareholders on corporate boards plagues Chinese enterprises [Wang and Xu
1999]. And as shown in a study of Russia, when only insiders retain control of a partly privatized firm,
management changes do not take place, and performance is not improved [Barberis et al. 1996].FEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 20
the part of investors; however, it is not clear why they would not be equally able to select the
best firms in local jurisdictions.
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The statistical analysis shows that decentralized administration has been a key factor in
determining business productivity in China. Apparently local authorities with better incentives
and facing competition from other jurisdictions for business investment offer environments more
conducive for business than more centralized governments.
Nonetheless, the performance gap between the wholly foreign enterprises in special
districts, and both state-owned and mixed-ownership enterprises, suggests that the regulatory and
business environment in China can be improved as the reform program continues. A rough
comparison of the productivity of the purely private foreign-owned enterprises with the
productivity in an industrial enterprise in the United States suggests that value added per worker
is less than a quarter of what might be achieved in the United States.
22
China’s imminent entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) will more closely
align it with the global economy, and accelerate the process of restructuring by broadening and
deepening the privatization and decentralization process. The WTO should also reduce barriers
to entry by foreign firms, and complement the privatization of Chinese firms and the shift to
local administration. Competition among jurisdictions is likely to increase as the opportunities
for foreign capital expand.
23 Thus, the reforms brought about by the WTO are likely to extend to
more Chinese enterprises the operational advantages—in terms of flexibility and freedom to
operate—that are now available in local jurisdictions and special districts. Measuring and
tracking these regulatory changes is imperative for future research.
Our final comment focuses on the need to examine these issues using firm-level time-
series and cohort data. Longitudinal firm level data sets will improve our ability to assess the
effects of transitional changes on performance and the relative costs and benefits of various
strategies. Developing data for this research is where we our efforts are currently focused.
THE CONFERENCE BOARD
                                                
22. Calculation uses Ren Ruoen [1997] and Adam Szirmai’s bilateral comparison studies.
23. The extent of persistent inter-regional price differences observed by Young [2000] demonstrates
the considerable room that remains to reduce these barriers in the future.FEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 21
REFERENCES
Barberis, Nicholas, Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Natalia Tsukanova (1996), “How Does
Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops,” Journal of Political Economy
104(4): 764-90.
Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee (2000), “Capture and Governance at Local and National
Levels,” American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 90(2): 135-139.
Bartelsman, Eric J. and Mark Doms (2000), “Understanding Productivity: Lessons from
Longitudinal Microdata,” Journal of Economic Literature, 38(3): 569-94.
Che, Jiahua and Yingyi Qian (1998a), “Institutional Environment, Community Government, and
Corporate Governance: Understanding China’s Township-Village Enterprises,” Journal of
Law, Economics, and Organization 14(1): 1-23.
_____ (1998b), “Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 113(2): 467-96.
CLSA Emerging Markets (2000), Corporate Governance, Hong Kong: CLSA Ltd., October.
Dewenter, Kathryn L. and Paul H. Malatesta (2001), “State-owned and Privately Owned Firms:
An Empirical Analysis of Profitability, Leverage, and Labor Intensity,” American Economic
Review 91(1): 320-334.
Dougherty, Sean M. (1997), “Special Topic Report: The Reliability of Chinese Statistics,” U.S.
Department of Commerce, on the Internet at http://www.chinaonline.com/refer/statistics/-
secure/us_prc.asp.
Gadal, Ahmed and Mary Shirley (1995), Bureaucrats in Business: the Economics and Politics of
Government Ownership, The World Bank, New York: Oxford University Press.
Granick, David (1990), Chinese State Enterprises: A Regional Property Rights Analysis,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Groves, Theodore, Yongmiao Hong, John McMillan, and Barry Naughton (1994), “Autonomy
and Incentives in Chinese State Enterprises,” Quarterly Journal of Econ. 109(1): 183-209.
Gregory, Neil, Stoyan Tenev, and Dileep Wagle (2000), China’s Emerging Private Enterprises:
Prospects for the New Century, International Financial Corporation, Washington, D.C., on
the Internet at http://www.ifc.org/publications/china_private_ent.pdf.
Ito, Takatoshi and Anne O. Krueger, eds. (2002), Privatization, Corporate Governance and
Transition Economies, East Asia Seminar on Economics Volume 12, NBER, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, on the Internet at http://www.nber.org/books/ease12/index.html,
forthcoming.
Jefferson, Gary H., Thomas R. Rawski, and Zheng Yuxin (1996), “Chinese Industrial
Productivity: Trends, Measurement, and Recent Developments,” Journal of Comparative
Economics 23(2): 146-180.
Jefferson, Gary H. and Inderjit Singh, eds. (1999), Enterprise Reform in China: Ownership,
Transition, and Performance, The World Bank, New York: Oxford University Press.
Jefferson, Gary H. (1999), “Are China’s Rural Enterprises Outperforming State Enterprises?
Estimating the Pure Ownership Effect,” in Jefferson and Singh (1999: 153-70).
Jefferson, Gary H. and Thomas R. Rawski (1999), “Ownership Change in Chinese Industry,” in
Jefferson and Singh (1999: 23-42).
Jefferson, Gary H., Zhang Ping, and John Z.Q. Zhao (1999a), “Structure, Authority, and
Incentives in Chinese Industry,” in Jefferson and Singh (1999: 43-64).FEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 22
Jefferson, Gary H., Lu Mai, John Z.Q. Zhao (1999b), “Reforming Property Rights in China’s
Industry,” in Jefferson and Singh (1999: 107-25).
Jefferson, Gary H., Inderjit Singh, Xing Junling, and Zhang Shouqing (1999c), “China’s Ind-
ustrial Performance: A Review of Recent Findings,” in Jefferson and Singh (1999: 127-52).
Jensen, J. Bradford and Robert H. McGuckin (1997), “Firm Performance and Evolution:
Empirical Regularities in the U.S. Microdata,” Industrial and Corporate Change 6(1): 25-47.
Kornai, János (1980), Economics of Shortage, Amsterdam: North Holland.
Li, David (1996), "A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies: the Case
of the Chinese Non-State Sector," Journal of Comparative Economics 23(1): 1-19.
____ (1998), “Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy,” American Economic Review
(Papers and Proceedings) 88(2): 393-97.
Li, David and Francis T. Lui (2001), “Why Do Governments Dump State Enterprises? Evidence
from China,” in Ito and Krueger (2002).
Li, Shaomin, Shuhe Li, and Weiying Zhang (2000), “The Road to Capitalism: Competition and
Institutional Change in China,” Journal of Comparative Economics 28(2): 269-292.
Lin, Justin Yifu, Fang Cai, and Zhou Li (1998), “Competition, Policy Burdens, and State-Owned
Enterprise Reform,” American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 88(2): 422-27.
Litwack, John M. and Yingyi Qian (1998), “Balanced or Unbalanced Development: Special
Economic Zones as Catalysts for Transition,” Journal of Comparative Econ. 26(1): 1-25.
McGuckin, Robert H., Sang V. Nguyen, Jeffrey R. Taylor, and Charles A. Waite (1992), “Post-
Reform Productivity Performance and Sources of Growth in Chinese Industry: 1980-85,”
Review of Income and Wealth 38(3): 249-66.
McGuckin, Robert H. and Sang V. Nguyen (1993), “Post-Reform Industrial Productivity
Performance of China: New Evidence from the 1985 Industrial Census Data,” Economic
Inquiry 31(3): 323-341.
National Bureau of Statistics (1993), Frequently Used Social and Economic Information
Categories and Code Standards (in Chinese), Beijing, China: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe.
____ (1996), Third National Industrial Census Organization & Implementation (in Chinese),
Beijing, China: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe.
____ (1997), People’s Republic of China Third National Industrial Census Materials (in
Chinese), Beijing, China: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe.
OECD (2000a), The OECD Productivity Manual, Paris: OECD Statistics Directorate, Division of
National Accounts.
____ (2000b), China in the Global Economy: Reforming China’s Enterprises, Paris: OECD.
Oi, Jean C. (1992), “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in
China,” World Politics 45: 99-126.
Perkins, Frances C. (1999), “Export Performance and Enterprise Reform in China’s Coastal
Provinces,” in Jefferson and Singh (1999: 241-64).
Qian, Yingyi (1995), “Reforming Corporate Governance and Finance in China,” in Masahiko
Aoki and Hyung-Ki Kim (eds.), Corporate Governance in Transition Economies: Insider
Control and the Role of Banks, The World Bank, 215-252.
____ (2000), “Government Control in Corporate Governance as a Transitional Institution:
Lessons from China,” in Joseph Stiglitz and Shahid Yusuf (eds.), Re-thinking the East Asian
Miracle, The World Bank.
Qian, Yingyi and Barry R. Weingast (1997), “Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market
Incentives,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(4): 83-92.FEDERALISM AND PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA 23
Qian, Yingyi and Gérard Roland (1998), “Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint,” American
Economic Review 88(5): 11143-1162.
Ren, Ruoen (1997), China’s Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective, Development
Center Studies, Paris: OECD.
Roland, Gérard (2000), Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets, and Firms, Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Wing Thye Woo (1997), “Understanding China’s Economic Performance,”
NBER Working Paper No. 5935, February.
Sachs, Jeffrey D., Wing Thye Woo, and Xiaokai Yang (2000), “Economic Reforms and
Constitutional Transition,” Center for International Development Working Paper 43, Harvard
University, April, on the Internet at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/043.htm.
Sonobe, Tetsushi and Keijiro Otsuka (2001), “Productivity Effects of TVE Privatization: The
Case Study of Garment and Metal Casting Enterprises in the Greater Yangtze River Region,”
in Ito and Krueger (2002).
Sun, Jian (2000), “State-Owned Enterprises in China: Soft Budget Constraints and Competition,”
Manuscript, Washington University, January.
Tybout, James R. (2000), “Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well do they
Do, and Why?” Journal of Economic Literature 38(1): 11-44.
U.S. Department of State (1996), China Country Commercial Guide: 1995-96, Office of the
Coordinator for Business, American Embassy, Beijing, China, on the Internet at
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/business/com_guides/index.html.
Walder, Andrew (1995), “Local Governments as Industrial Firms: An Organizational Analysis of
China’s Transitional Economy,” American Journal of Sociology 101(2): 263-301.
Woo, Wing Thye, Wen Hai, Yibiao Jin, and Gang Fan (1994), “How Successful has Chinese
Enterprise Reform Been? Pitfalls in Opposite Biases and Focus,” Journal of Comparative
Economics 18: 410-37.
Wu, Yanrui (1996), Productive Performance in Chinese Enterprises, New York: St. Martin’s
Press.
Xu, Xiaonian and Yan Wang (1999), “ Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in
Chinese Stock Companies,” China Economic Review 10: 75-98.
Yao, Yang (2001), “Government Commitment and the Outcome of Privatization in China,” in Ito
and Krueger (2002).
Young, Alwyn (2000), “The Razor’s Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People’s
Republic of China,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(4): 1091-1135.
Zhang, Anming, Yimin Zhang, and Ronald Zhao (2001), “Impact of Ownership and Competition
on the Productivity of Chinese Enterprises,” Journal of Comparative Econ. 29(2): 327-46.FIGURE 1:
















Note: Number of Large and Medium Enterprises under Supervision in Italics.
Firms with missing or ambiguous jurisdiction information are excluded.TABLE 2
Production Function Estimates, Full Sample
Regression of Gross Output Implied Difference
per Production Worker (log) on: Coefficient t-Statistic in Productivity
Constant -.098 -2.7
Total Capital per Prod. Worker (log) .029 4.8
Intermediate Materials per Prod. Worker (log) .882 140
Number of Production Workers (log) .035 12
1990s Machinery Vintage Value Share .077 10
Average Worker Wage w/ Benefits (log) .195 20
Relative to State-owned (14,752): State-owned = 0%
    Collective Enterprises (3,747) .058 9.6 5.9%
    Joint Stock Companies (887) .060 7.2 6.2%
    HK/TW-invested (770) .071 5.8 7.4%
    Foreign Joint Ventures (756) .073 5.6 7.6%
    Pure Foreign-owned (80) .171 3.3 18.6%
Relative to Federal (13,608): Federal = 0%
    Local Jurisdiction (7,384) .074 13 7.7%
Dummy variable controls (joint t-statistic):
    Age of Firm 5 periods 6.1
    Location of Firm 333 districts 38
    Detailed Industry 554 industries 105
            





    NOTE.—The White Heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix is used for t-statistics. Mean log Gross Output 
per Worker is 4.10. The 228 domestic joint ventures, which look very similar to state-owned enterprises 
(Coeff.=.009, t=.48), are included in the state-owned grouping. Note that a fully interactive version of the above 
model yielded estimates of the impact of ownership and jurisdictional governance very similar to those shown above. TABLE 3(a)
The Effects of Jurisdiction on Productivity for Each Ownership Type
Regression of Gross Output
per Production Worker (log) on: State-owned Collectives Joint Stock HK/TW-inv. Foreign JVs
Constant -.106** -.067 .099 -.067 .036
Total Capital per Prod. Worker (log) .029** .023** .093** -.026 .057
Intermediate Materials per Prod. Worker (log) .861** .925** .812** .984** .880**
Number of Production Workers (log) .039** .020** .022* .028** .025
1990s Machinery Vintage Value Share .101** .034** -.006 .067 -.003
Average Worker Wage w/ Benefits (log) .229** .108** .180** .084** .093**
Relative to Federal:
    Local Jurisdiction .074** .082** .089** .053* .045
Controls are jointly significant for:
    Age of Firm Yes Yes No No No
    Location of Firm Yes Yes Yes Yes No
    Detailed Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 .912 .949 .946 .937 .939
Number of Observations 14,752 3,747 887 770 756
TABLE 3(b)
Locally Administered Firms are More Productive, under all Types of Ownership
Impact of Local Administration:
               exp(Coefficient) - 1 = State-owned Collectives Joint Stock HK/TW-inv. Foreign JVs
Relative to Federally Administered 8.7%** 8.5%** 9.3%** 5.4%* 4.6%
Productivity of Local Admin. Firms within each Ownership Type
OLS Coefficient Estimates
    NOTE.—A separate estimation of Equation 1 is run for each of the five ownership types in which jurisdiction varies.
    NOTE.— Percentages are based on a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is administered by a local jurisdiction.
    * Significantlly different from zero at the 90% confidence level. ** Significant at the 99% confidence level.TABLE 4(a)
Regression of Gross Output
per Production Worker (log) on: Federally Administered Locally Administered
Constant -.053 -.019
Total Capital per Prod. Worker (log) .010 .044**
Intermediate Materials per Prod. Worker (log) .874** .896**
Number of Production Workers (log) .036** .024**
1990s Machinery Vintage Value Share .096** .057**
Average Worker Wage w/ Benefits (log) .226** .129**
Relative to State-owned:
    Collective Enterprises .046** .051**
    Joint Stock Companies .063** .057**
    HK/TW-invested .077** .052**
    Foreign Joint Ventures .092** .032*
Controls are jointly significant for:
    Age of Firm Yes No
    Location of Firm Yes Yes
    Detailed Industry Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 13,530 7,382
Number of Observations .923 .948
TABLE 4(b)
Impact by Ownership Type:
          exp(Coefficient) - 1 = Federally Administered Locally Administered
Collective Enterprises 4.7%** 5.2%**
Joint Stock Companies 6.5%** 5.9%**
HK/TW-invested 8.0%** 5.3%**
Foreign Joint Ventures 9.6%** 3.3%*
OLS Coefficient Estimates
The Effects of Ownership on Produtivity for Each Jurisdiction Level
Productivity Relative to State-owned Firms
More Private Firms are More Productive under Federal Administration
    NOTE.—A separate estimation of Equation 1 is run for each of the five ownership types in which 
jurisdiction varies.
    NOTE.—Percentages are based on a dummy variable that equals one if firm is of the respective 
ownership type. Bracketed groups are statistically indistinguishable at the 95% level. * Significantly 
different from zero at the 90% confidence level. ** Significant at the 99% level. TABLE 5
Private Equity only Matters for State-owned Enterprises with
Federal Administration
State-owned Enterprises
Federally Administered Locally Administered
1) Any Private Equity 5.3%* 0.8%
2) 10% or More Private Equity 6.2%* 1.4%
3) 50% or More Private Equity 8.5%* 1.1%
Total firms (1, 2, and 3 use same samples) n = 10,679 n = 3,731
Amount of Private Equity
Productivity Relative to Remaining Firms
    NOTE.—Percentages are based on a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has the given threshold 
of private equity. A separate OLS estimation of Equation 1 is run for each of the three definitions and 
under both levels of administration (six estimates).  * Significant at the 99% confidence level.TABLE A-1
Firm Characteristics by Ownership Type and Jursidiction Level
Gross Total 1990s Avg. Avg. Avg. College Avg. Sales
Ownership Type and Output/ Capital/ Vintage Book Val. Num. of Monthly Grad. Year of Export
    Jurisdiction Level Worker Worker Share of Capital Workers Wage Share Origin Share
SOEs w/ DJVs (15,714) 81 161 38% 251,622 1,619 562 8% 1963 9%
    Local Firms (4,054) 81 118 44% 86,071 879 417 4% 1970 9%
    Federal (11,321) 81 177 36% 310,905 1,883 614 10% 1961 9%
Collectives (3,984) 119 139 51% 82,043 731 479 4% 1973 22%
    Local Firms (2,801) 137 145 56% 85,275 758 463 3% 1976 22%
    Federal (1,111) 76 126 39% 73,894 662 520 6% 1965 22%
Joint-stock (959) 144 238 51% 392,961 1,714 676 9% 1967 13%
    Local Firms (329) 126 156 56% 170,307 1,067 499 5% 1972 16%
    Federal (583) 155 284 47% 518,609 2,079 775 11% 1964 11%
HK/TW-inv. (933) 262 401 58% 194,485 682 768 9% 1988 27%
    Local Firms (305) 219 286 64% 117,347 586 598 5% 1988 32%
    Federal (508) 288 470 55% 240,798 739 870 11% 1988 25%
Foreign JVs (917) 366 608 60% 255,213 657 955 14% 1989 26%
    Local Firms (229) 305 419 65% 138,790 604 606 6% 1988 29%
    Federal (603) 389 679 58% 299,426 677 1,087 17% 1989 26%
Pure Foreign (97) 472 771 70% 246,216 567 955 15% 1991 62%
Firm Mean (22,604) 113 189 43% 225,257 1,388 576 8% 1967 13%
  Note: Output and Capital in 1,000 yuan. Wage is in yuan/month. Number of firms with valid worker data in parenthesis. Totals do not
           always match due to lack of jurisdiction information or missing values on one or more variables.Table A-2
Substantial Trend Toward More Private Firms
Change Change Change
over over over
Ownership Type 1995 1999 1995-99 1995 1999 1995-99 1995 1999 1995-99
State-owned Firms 15,940 11,495 -4,445 71% 60% -10% 81 107 32%
Collective Firms 4,068 2,738 -1,330 9.3% 7.8% -1.5% 108 144 33%
Joint Stock Firms 959 2,473 1,514 7.5% 10% 2.3% 143 158 11%
HK/TW-invested 933 1,549 616 5.2% 7.9% 2.7% 265 290 9.5%
Foreign Joint Ventures 916 1,508 592 6.4% 10% 3.3% 347 444 28%
Pure Foreign Firms 97 476 379 0.9% 3.6% 2.6% 490 385 -21%
Domestic Private Firms 3 316 313 D 0.7% 0.7% D 153 D
Total 22,916 20,555 -2,361 100% 100% 0%
           
Sales/Worker Share of Total Sales Number of Large and 
Medium Firms Revenue